How government payments to the vulnerable can multiply to create economic growth for everyone.

The economic fallout of COVID-19 left people around the world facing a significant threat to their livelihood. As governments scrambled to mitigate the pandemic’s impact on their populations, many decided to use direct payments to support vulnerable citizens.

More than a sixth of the world’s population received some sort of cash transfer in 2020. These programmes were a key source of support for many people during the COVID-19 pandemic, with governments across the globe scaling up or introducing such payments.

Brazil, for example, introduced the Auxílio Emergencial programme, while the US implemented Economic Impact Payments. Both cash transfer programmes aimed to shield vulnerable populations. This was also not exclusive to middle- and high-income countries. Togo, for instance, implemented the Novissi cash transfer programme during the pandemic.

Using cash payments to protect people’s livelihoods and lift the poor out of poverty is not a novel strategy. It can be a simple way to provide basic social protection to people in need, helping citizens to withstand sudden shocks and also facilitating their recovery after a crisis.

Cash assistance as financial burden?

But cash transfers still attract a lot of debate. Besides typical concerns like creating dependency and reducing labour supply, these programmes are costly. This can cause concern about their sustainability and hinder the initial implementation and scale-up.

For example, the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment programme in Uganda in 2010 became so politicised that it was challenged every step of the way to its implementation and later expansion. Even before its pilot programme, concerns regarding its financial sustainability and the potential creation of welfare dependencies were raised by politicians.

During periods of economic crisis, austerity policies can also directly influence social assistance initiatives. After the 2010 economic crisis, for example, Greece initially suspended and subsequently terminated its housing benefit programme, attributing this decision to budget constraints.

But cash transfer programmes aren’t “handouts”. The positive impacts on the people that receive them are well documented. They are powerful instruments for strengthening household resilience and fostering opportunities that can extend beyond the immediate recipients.

The multiplier effect

There is another vital element of social cash transfers that most people aren’t aware of: the economic multiplier effect. In a recent study with Ugo Gentilini, Giorgia Valleriani and Yuko Okamura of the World Bank, and Giulio Bordon of the UN’s International Labour Organization, we found the multiplier effect can greatly enhance the financial sustainability of social cash transfer programmes.

The core concept is that every dollar transferred that is spent rather than saved can increase the total income in the economy beyond its original value.

Consider a smallholder farmer who uses some of her grant to buy fertiliser at the local market. The local merchant profits from it and then spends this additional income, increasing profits for someone else and setting off a ripple effect through the economy. These taxable gains go beyond the people that get the payment, effectively “multiplying” the original grant’s worth for the economy.

Investing in the entire economy

We reviewed 23 studies of 19 cash assistance programmes across 13 countries and found substantial evidence of this multiplier effect from social cash transfers.

In Brazil, for example, Bolsa Família, the current national social welfare programme of Brazil and one of the largest cash transfer programmes in the world, was found to increase real GDP per R$1 (£0.16) spent by R$1.04. This is a small but positive spillover into the Brazilian economy.

Another noteworthy example is the GiveDirectly initiative in rural western Kenya, a pilot programme that offered a US$1,000 (£791) one-off transfer to 10,500 poor households. This programme led to a strong positive economic shock with a multiplier of 2.5 per US$1. So, every US$1 transferred generated a value of US$2.50 locally – a strong positive spillover to the local economy.

Social cash transfers have the potential to not only support the poor and vulnerable, but also to stimulate the wider economy. Rather than simply accepting the general perception of social transfers as an expense, we should start recognising their true value as an investment in a country’s entire economy.

Conrad Nunnenmacher, United Nations University; Franziska Gassmann, Maastricht University, and Julieta Morais, United Nations University

Conrad Nunnenmacher, PhD Research Fellow in Innovation, Economics, Governance and Sustainable Development, United Nations University; Franziska Gassmann, Professor of Social Protection and Development, Maastricht University, and Julieta Morais, Researcher in Social Protection, United Nations University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Deceit pays dividends: How CEO lies can boost stock ratings and fool even respected financial analysts.

The multibillion-dollar collapse of FTX – the high-profile cryptocurrency exchange whose founder now awaits trial on fraud charges – serves as a stark reminder of the perils of deception in the financial world.

The lies from FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried date back to the company’s very beginning, prosecutors say. He lied to customers and investors alike, it is claimed, as part of what U.S. Attorney Damian Williams has called “one of the biggest financial frauds in American history.”

How were so many people apparently fooled?

A new study in the Strategic Management Journal sheds some light on the issue. In it, my colleagues and I found that even professional financial analysts fall for CEO lies – and that the best-respected analysts might be the most gullible.

Financial analysts give expert advice to help companies and investors make money. They predict how much a company will earn and suggest whether to buy or sell its stock. By guiding money into good investments, they help not just individual businesses but the entire economy grow.

But while financial analysts are paid for their advice, they aren’t oracles. As a management professor, I wondered how often they get duped by lying executives – so my colleagues and I used machine learning to find out. We developed an algorithm, trained on S&P 1500 earnings call transcripts from 2008 to 2016, that can reliably detect deception 84% of the time. Specifically, the algorithm identifies distinct linguistic patterns that occur when an individual is lying.

Our results were striking. We found that analysts were far more likely to give “buy” or “strong buy” recommendations after listening to deceptive CEOs – by nearly 28 percentage points, on average – rather than their more honest counterparts.

We also found that highly esteemed analysts fell for CEO lies more often than their lesser-known counterparts did. In fact, those named “all-star” analysts by trade publisher Institutional Investor were 5.3 percentage points more likely to upgrade habitually dishonest CEOs than their less-celebrated counterparts.

Although we applied this technology to gain insight into this corner of finance for an academic study, its broader use raises a number of challenging ethical questions around using AI to measure psychological constructs.

Biased toward believing

It seems counterintuitive: Why would professional givers of financial advice consistently fall for lying executives? And why would the most reputable advisers seem to have the worst results?

These findings reflect the natural human tendency to assume that others are being honest – what’s known as the “truth bias.” Thanks to this habit of mind, analysts are just as susceptible to lies as anyone else.

What’s more, we found that elevated status fosters a stronger truth bias. First, “all-star” analysts often gain a sense of overconfidence and entitlement as they rise in prestige. They start to believe they’re less likely to be deceived, leading them to take CEOs at face value. Second, these analysts tend to have closer relationships with CEOs, which studies show can increase the truth bias. This makes them even more prone to deception.

Given this vulnerability, businesses may want to reevaluate the credibility of “all-star” designations. Our research also underscores the importance of accountability in governance and the need for strong institutional systems to counter individual biases.

An AI ‘lie detector’?

The tool we developed for this study could have applications well beyond the world of business. We validated the algorithm using fraudulent transcripts, retracted articles in medical journals and deceptive YouTube videos. It could easily be deployed in different contexts.

It’s important to note that the tool doesn’t directly measure deception; it identifies language patterns associated with lying. This means that even though it’s highly accurate, it’s susceptible to both false positives and negatives – and false allegations of dishonesty in particular could have devastating consequences.

What’s more, tools like this struggle to distinguish socially beneficial “white lies” – which foster a sense of community and emotional well-being – from more serious lies. Flagging all deceptions indiscriminately could disrupt complex social dynamics, leading to unintended consequences.

These issues would need to be addressed before this type of technology is adopted widely. But that future is closer than many might realize: Companies in fields such as investing, security and insurance are already starting to use it.

Big questions remain

The widespread use of AI to catch lies would have profound social implications – most notably, by making it harder for the powerful to lie without consequence.

That might sound like an unambiguously good thing. But while the technology offers undeniable advantages, such as early detection of threats or fraud, it could also usher in a perilous transparency culture. In such a world, thoughts and emotions could become subject to measurement and judgment, eroding the sanctuary of mental privacy.

This study also raises ethical questions about using AI to measure psychological characteristics, particularly where privacy and consent are concerned. Unlike traditional deception research, which relies on human subjects who consent to be studied, this AI model operates covertly, detecting nuanced linguistic patterns without a speaker’s knowledge.

The implications are staggering. For instance, in this study, we developed a second machine learning model to gauge the level of suspicion in a speaker’s tone. Imagine a world where social scientists can create tools to assess any facet of your psychology, applying them without your consent. Not too appealing, is it?

As we enter a new era of AI, advanced psychometric tools offer both promise and peril. These technologies could revolutionize business by providing unprecedented insights into human psychology. They could also violate people’s rights and destabilize society in surprising and disturbing ways. The decisions we make today – about ethics, oversight and responsible use – will set the course for years to come.

Steven J. Hyde, Boise State University

Steven J. Hyde, Assistant Professor of Management, Boise State University

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Entrepreneurs, beware: Owning your own business can make it harder to get hired later.

If you’ve been thinking about starting your own business lately, you’re not alone. Americans began launching ventures in record numbers during the pandemic, with an above-trend pace continuing through 2023.

Unfortunately, many of of these enterprises won’t last long: 30% of new businesses fail within two years, and half don’t last past five, according to the Small Business Administration. While some of these unlucky founders will pursue new ventures, many others will try to rejoin the traditional labor force.

You can’t blame them. People often see “going back to work” as a safety net for risk-taking entrepreneurs. As professors of management who study entrepreneurship, we wanted to see if this was true.

Screened out

So we surveyed more than 700 hiring professionals to determine whether founders really can get new jobs that easily, as well as seven former entrepreneurs who successfully made the transition back into the workforce.

We found that former business owners were actually less likely to get interviews compared with applicants with only traditional experience. This was true regardless of whether they had sold or closed their businesses. And the longer they were out of the traditional workforce, the worse their chances of success were.

Why do employers hesitate to take a chance on former business owners?

It starts at the earliest stages, with the recruiters who screen people into – or out of – consideration for interviews. We found that recruiters worried that entrepreneurs would jump ship to start their own companies as soon as they can. This is a problem for employers, since hiring is a long, expensive process that can take months or even years to pay off.

For example, one recruiter told us, “I am looking for candidates that will be long-term employees, as we invest quite a bit into each hire. When I interview people, it is generally a red flag if they say they want to start their own business or already have a business on the side.”

A related fear: A worker who leaves to start a new venture might be tempted to poach talent, clients and tactics from their old employer.

Recruiters were also concerned that former entrepreneurs may refuse to take directions. Spending time as your own boss can make it difficult to adapt to a lower place on the organizational hierarchy. As one recruiter in our study put it, former business owners “are used to being the one who makes all the decisions.”

They also raised issues of job fit, questioning whether ex-entrepreneurs’ knowledge and abilities would translate to traditional work. “The concern would be the skills they have developed don’t transfer,” said one of our interviewees. In addition, for entrepreneurs who have worked alone, it can be difficult for recruiters to know how well they’ll perform with others.

Even when a former entrepreneur is a good match for a position, recruiters can fail to make the connection because of stereotypes or misunderstandings about their experience. A former bakery owner we interviewed recalled applying for a position and being pigeonholed based on their experience: “They said, ‘Oh, I wish we were hiring for a baker!’ and I said, ‘No, no, no, I’m applying for your front office.’ It was like they thought all I knew was just a baker, but that is far from the truth.”

Landing an interview

Our research adds to a growing body of evidence that ex-entrepreneurs struggle to get interviews and offers. Thankfully, it also offers insights that organizations can use to improve their applicant pool – and that enterprising job seekers can use to boost their odds.

Our study found that former entrepreneurs face less bias when they apply to roles that seem entrepreneurish – in other words, that are in line with stereotypes about business owners. So, for example, they’re more likely to land interviews when applying for positions with a lot of autonomy, such as in new business development, rather than those that require following lots of rules, such as in legal compliance.

Relatedly, our research suggests that recruiters – perhaps unintentionally – have biases against ex-entrepreneurs. Acknowledging such tendencies is a good first step toward minimizing their influence. Moreover, not all recruiters are equally affected: Another recent study showed that recruiters who also have prior entrepreneurial experience – as well as women and those who were recently hired – were less likely to screen out former business owners. So organizations with more diverse hiring teams and a deeper understanding of entrepreneurial experience might see less-biased results.

For their part, ex-entrepreneur job applicants would be wise to highlight in-demand aspects of their work history. For instance, a recent survey by Boston Consulting Group found that executives rank innovation as one of their top three priorities. Former entrepreneurs should emphasize their many valuable characteristics – such as being passionate and creative – that contribute to innovation.

The lack of a traditional employment history may create obstacles for entrepreneurs trying to rejoin the workforce. Recruiters who overlook their value risk missing out on strong candidates.

Jacob A. Waddingham, Texas State University and Miles Zachary, Auburn University

Jacob A. Waddingham, Assistant Professor of Management, Texas State University and Miles Zachary, Associate Professor of Management and Entrepreneurship, Auburn University

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Insider trading − the legal kind − is a lot more profitable if you work for a multinational company.

Corporate insiders who trade stocks based on the information they gain on the job earn a lot more if they work at multinational corporations than their peers at U.S. companies with no sales abroad. That’s the main finding of our new peer-reviewed research.

Insider trading happens when a director or employee trades their company’s public stock or other security based on important or “material” information about that business. Insider trading isn’t illegal as long as the person reports the trade to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the information is already in the public domain.

We wanted to know if multinational insiders stand to make more money because of the complexity of the information they could possess relative to outsiders.

So we examined returns from over 2.5 million trades reported to the SEC from 1987 to 2019 by insiders at over 10,000 companies. This is only a subset of all insider trades reported during the period because we focused on only those transactions most likely to be informed by the employee’s insight. We then compared monthly returns for insiders at multinational and domestic companies with those for a typical investor.

We found that all insiders beat the market, but those at multinationals did better – especially if they were on the highest rungs of the corporate ladder. While insiders at domestic companies typically obtained a return of 2.4% in the month following a stock purchase, those at multinational corporations reaped 2.8%. That may not sound like a lot, but, assuming consistent returns, it could amount to earning $170,000 more if an insider traded $1 million over several months. And it’s triple the typical stock market monthly gain of 0.9%

The most in-the-know insiders – executives and others with the most intimate knowledge of the company and its operations – at multinationals got an even bigger advantage, earning 3.6% per month vs. 2.7% at domestic companies.

Why it matters

Insider trading is familiar to most people from movies that portray it in criminal terms, such as Gordon Gekko of “Wall Street.” In the film, he makes millions off others’ inside information.

But even when it is legal, insider trading is very profitable. That’s because insiders trading on public information are more knowledgeable about their industry and process information more effectively than outside investors.

With global companies, the advantage of being an insider increases. Since multinational companies generate earnings in foreign countries, with different currencies, cultures, economies and operating environments, it can be hard for an outsider or analyst to accurately value the company and its stock price. This is especially true when the company does business in regions that are culturally and linguistically distinct from the U.S. This helps insiders trade more efficiently, by buying underpriced stocks at a bargain and selling them later for a windfall.

Companies often motivate their employees to work harder by offering them a stake in their success, but if insiders seem to be getting an unfair advantage over ordinary investors, it may undermine trust in financial markets. The size and profitability of such trades – particularly in light of our data – mean regulators and policymakers may want to consider whether new restrictions on insider trading are needed, such as placing additional limits on the timing or frequency of trades.

What other research is being done

Scholars, including us, are pursuing many avenues of research on insider trading, such as how insider trading restrictions are determined and how insider trades inform markets when news is limited. We’ve recently conducted research on how insider trades by colleagues at the same company tend to cluster together, and we are currently looking at how innovation affects insider trading.

Another recently published project relates to how information is incorporated into stock market prices and how investors underreact to news that may affect insiders’ ability to trade profitably. Similarly, ongoing research uses a GPT language model to assess the complexity of business regulatory filings and financial statements by analyzing technical jargon that can confuse investors, which could also affect how outside investors understand stock prices compared with insiders.

The Research Brief is a short take about interesting academic work.

D. Brian Blank, Mississippi State University and Dallin Alldredge, Florida International University

D. Brian Blank, Assistant Professor of Finance, Mississippi State University and Dallin Alldredge, Assistant Professor of Finance, Florida International University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Cryptocurrencies are experiencing their worst crisis since the arrival of the first crypto assets and virtual currencies in the 1990s and their democratization in the 2010s.

Bitcoin had an unprecedented tumble in late 2020 and has yet to recover. In addition to this sharp decline, there is much discussion about the worrisome collapse of some so-called stablecoins, which are supposed to be less volatile.

This is compounded by the fall of cryptocurrency giants, particularly due to allegations of fraud in cases like the FTX scandal. At its peak, FTX had one million users and was the third-largest cryptocurrency exchange in terms of volume.

Experts agree that the aftershocks of its collapse have hit investors hard and will likely slow the pace of crypto asset adoption for the next few years.

As an expert in the field of cryptocurrencies, I will try to answer the following question: are cryptocurrencies really here to stay, or are they just a fad?

Speculation and extreme volatility

Cryptoassets include tokens that can be used for digital currency purposes (i.e. cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum). They are also used for investment in an entity (a “security token,” which entitles the holder to ownership of a portion of an entity), or for products or services (a “utility token,” which entitles the holder to a product once it has been produced, for example).

Stablecoins, which are supposed to be associated with lower volatility, are unique in that they are backed by a currency (e.g. the U.S. dollar), a commodity (e.g. gold) or a financial instrument (e.g. a stock or a bond). This is to keep the value of the digital currency stable.

Bitcoin’s plunge is followed in the headlines on a daily basis. While this is not the first time it has fallen, it is particularly noteworthy as it is the biggest drop in value since late 2020. The collapse is partly due to rising interest rates and the flight of investors from these risky investments. Although it is recovering, Bitcoin is still a long way from the heights it once reached.

This media coverage raises many questions about the sustainability of these cryptoassets. Indeed, the latter are marked by extreme volatility in their unregulated markets in addition to being associated with speculation by many players in the financial world.

Indeed, the BBC recently reported that cryptocurrency laundering rose 30 per cent in 2021. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission, which aims to protect U.S. consumers, reported that in 2021, fraud schemes cost investors more than $1 billion in cryptocurrencies. Needless to say, very few of the defrauded investors have recovered their money.

One billion users by 2022

Yet we are seeing a slow but sure increase in the adoption of cryptocurrencies by companies. In an ongoing study of the impact of cryptocurrency adoption by public companies on their social responsibility, I noted that many of them, such as Starbucks and McDonald’s, have started to accept Bitcoin as a form of payment. This is particularly the case in their branches in El Salvador, following that country’s adoption of Bitcoin as legal tender.

Others, such as Japanese online retail giant Rakuten, have chosen to accept cryptocurrencies even if their country is not pushing to adopt Bitcoin as a currency. They say they are driven by a desire to offer more payment options to their customers.

The user base for cryptocurrencies is growing year on year. For example, Crypto.com, an exchange platform, estimated that about 295 million people had entered the cryptocurrency market as of December 2021. The platform expected the number of users to cross the one billion mark by December 2022.

Cryptocurrencies also allow people with unreliable or insecure banking systems to access a parallel banking system that is independent of the traditional banking system. Offering a less affluent part of the population access to a different form of banking system is one of the reasons the President of El Salvador gave for making Bitcoin legal tender in the country.

A healthy fluctuation

The growing interest in decentralized finance (DeFi), as well as the development of the metaverse, are also factors that influence the sustainability of cryptocurrencies. Decentralized finance often relies on stablecoins for its operation. Meanwhile, the metaverse, a universe of 3D virtual worlds, also allows the use of cryptocurrencies to purchase goods or services, creating an immersive world.

Experts in the sector believe that, despite the debacle that the cryptoasset market has experienced recently, decentralized finance — particularly via products backed by cryptoassets — is here to stay. This is because there is a market and players willing to participate.

Moreover, they argue that while this sharp decline in cryptocurrency-related markets does remove some players, this is a welcome change. By the admission of Raoul Ullens, co-founder of Brussels Blockchain Week (an annual conference devoted to blockchain and cryptocurrencies):

it is healthy, for the adoption, the maturation of these Web3 technologies, to skim, to rebalance the sector. […] An unhealthy ecosystem will not attract the masses.

According to these players, such a drop in the cryptoasset markets is not only necessary, but also healthy, contributing as it does to re-balancing the valuation of cryptocurrencies.

Cryptocurrencies are here to stay

The launch of cryptocurrencies by central banks, via central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), also lends weight to the argument that cryptoassets are here to stay. Indeed, the Bank of Canada is currently working on the creation of a CBDC. According to the institution, a CBDC issued by the Bank of Canada would be an “official digital currency (that) would retain its face value in Canadian dollars because it is issued by the Bank of Canada, just like bank notes.”

Other nations in the world have already issued such a currency, including the Bahamas (Sand Dollar) and Nigeria (eNaira). One reason CBDCs are different from privately issued digital currencies (such as Bitcoin or Ethereum) is that their intended use is for transaction purposes only, not for investment or speculation. They offer the same possibilities of use as cash.

CBDCs also aim to promote the financial inclusion of a part of the population that has little or no access to the traditional banking system, and to simplify the implementation of monetary and fiscal policy in the issuing countries.

Developments in the world of digital currencies, whether in the metaverse or with the arrival of the CBDC, and the craze that they continue to generate, mean cryptocurrency is here to stay.

This durability means the form of cryptoassets take will continue to evolve and transform with the technologies that support them (notably, blockchains) and the variation in demand from users and/or investors.

Annie Lecompte, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

Annie Lecompte, Assistant prof – Audit, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Why SVB and Signature Bank failed so fast – and the US banking crisis isn’t over yet.

Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank failed with enormous speed – so quickly that they could be textbook cases of classic bank runs, in which too many depositors withdraw their funds from a bank at the same time. The failures at SVB and Signature were two of the three biggest in U.S. banking history, following the collapse of Washington Mutual in 2008.

How could this happen when the banking industry has been sitting on record levels of excess reserves – or the amount of cash held beyond what regulators require?

While the most common type of risk faced by a commercial bank is a jump in loan defaults – known as credit risk – that’s not what is happening here. As an economist who has expertise in banking, I believe it boils down to two other big risks every lender faces: interest rate risk and liquidity risk.

Interest rate risk

A bank faces interest rate risk when the rates increase rapidly within a shorter period.

That’s exactly what has happened in the U.S. since March 2022. The Federal Reserve has been aggressively raising rates – 4.5 percentage points so far – in a bid to tame soaring inflation. As a result, the yield on debt has jumped at a commensurate rate.

The yield on one-year U.S. government Treasury notes hit a 17-year high of 5.25% in March 2023, up from less than 0.5% at the beginning of 2022. Yields on 30-year Treasurys have climbed almost 2 percentage points.

As yields on a security go up, its price goes down. And so such a rapid rise in rates in so short a time caused the market value of previously issued debt – whether corporate bonds or government Treasury bills – to plunge, especially for longer-dated debt.

For example, a 2 percentage point gain in a 30-year bond’s yield can cause its market value to plunge by around 32%.

SVB, as Silicon Valley Bank is known, had a massive share of its assets – 55% – invested in fixed-income securities, such as U.S. government bonds.

Of course, interest rate risk leading to a drop in market value of a security is not a huge problem as long as the owner can hold onto it until maturity, at which point it can collect its original face value without realizing any loss. The unrealized loss stays hidden on the bank’s balance sheet and disappears over time.

But if the owner has to sell the security before its maturity at a time when the market value is lower than face value, the unrealized loss becomes an actual loss.

That’s exactly what SVB had to do earlier this year as its customers, dealing with their own cash shortfalls, began withdrawing their deposits – while even higher interest rates were expected.

This bring us to liquidity risk.

Liquidity risk

Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank won’t be able to meet its obligations when they come due without incurring losses.

For example, if you spend US$150,000 of your savings to buy a house and down the road you need some or all of that money to deal with another emergency, you’re experiencing a consequence of liquidity risk. A large chunk of your money is now tied up in the house, which is not easily exchangeable for cash.

Customers of SVB were withdrawing their deposits beyond what it could pay using its cash reserves, and so to help meet its obligations the bank decided to sell $21 billion of its securities portfolio at a loss of $1.8 billion. The drain on equity capital led the lender to try to raise over $2 billion in new capital.

The call to raise equity sent shockwaves to SVB’s customers, who were losing confidence in the bank and rushed to withdraw cash. A bank run like this can cause even a healthy bank to go bankrupt in a matter days, especially now in the digital age.

In part this is because many of SVB’s customers had deposits well above the $250,000 insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. – and so they knew their money might not be safe if the bank were to fail. Roughly 88% of deposits at SVB were uninsured.

Signature faced a similar problem, as SVB’s collapse prompted many of its customers to withdraw their deposits out of a similar concern over liquidity risk. About 90% of its deposits were uninsured.

Systemic risk?

All banks face interest rate risk today on some of their holdings because of the Fed’s rate-hiking campaign.

This has resulted in $620 billion in unrealized losses on bank balance sheets as of December 2022.

But most banks are unlikely to have significant liquidity risk.

While SVB and Signature were complying with regulatory requirements, the composition of their assets was not in line with industry averages.

Signature had just over 5% of its assets in cash and SVB had 7%, compared with the industry average of 13%. In addition, SVB’s 55% of assets in fixed-income securities compares with the industry average of 24%.

The U.S. government’s decision to backstop all deposits of SVB and Signature regardless of their size should make it less likely that banks with less cash and more securities on their books will face a liquidity shortfall because of massive withdrawals driven by sudden panic.

However, with over $1 trillion of bank deposits currently uninsured, I believe that the banking crisis is far from over.

Vidhura S. Tennekoon, Indiana University

Vidhura S. Tennekoon, Assistant Professor of Economics, Indiana University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

To the delight of investors across the cryptosphere, the price of bitcoin (BTC) has rallied over 53% since its low of US$15,476 (£12,519) in November. Now trading around US$23,000, there’s much talk that the bottom has finally been reached for the leading cryptocurrency after a year of painful decline – in November 2021, the price peaked at almost US$70,000.

If so, it’s not only good news for bitcoin but the whole market in cryptocurrencies, since the others broadly move in line with the leader. So is crypto back in business?

Dotcom lessons

The past is littered with various periods of market turmoil, from the global financial crisis of 2007-09 to the COVID-19 collapse in 2020. But neither of these is a particularly good comparison for our purposes because they both saw sharp drops and recoveries, as opposed to the slow unwinding of bitcoin. A better comparison would be the dotcom bubble burst in 2000-02, which you can see in the chart below (the Nasdaq is the index that tracks all tech stocks).

Nasdaq 100 index 1995-2005

Look at the bitcoin chart since it peaked in November 2021 and the price action looks fairly similar:

Bitcoin bear market price chart 2021-23

Both charts show that bear markets go through various periods where prices rise but don’t reach the same level as the previous peak – known as “lower highs”. If bitcoin is following a similar trajectory to the early 2000s Nasdaq, it would make sense that the current price will be another lower high and that it will be followed by another lower low.

This is partly because like the 2000s Nasdaq, bitcoin seems to be following a pattern known as an Elliott Wave. Named after the renowned American stock market analyst Ralph Nelson Elliott, this essentially argues that during a bear phase, investors shift between different emotional states of disappointment and hope, before they finally despair and decide the market will never turn in their favour. This is a final wave of heavy selling known as capitulation.

You can see this idea on the chart below, where bitcoin is the green and red line and Z is the potential capitulation point at around US$13,000 (click on the chart to make it bigger). The black line is the path that the Nasdaq took in the early 2000s. The blue pointing finger above that line is potentially the equivalent place to where the bitcoin price is now.

Bitcoin now vs Nasdaq in the early 2000s

The one other thing to note on the chart is the wavy line that’s moving horizontally along the bottom. This is the stochRSI or stochastic relative strength index, which is an indication of when the asset looks overbought (when the line is peaking) or oversold (when it’s bottoming).

A sign of a coming shift is when the stochRSI moves in the opposite direction to where the price is heading: so now the stochRSI is coming down but the price has held up around US$23,000. This too suggests a fall could be imminent.

The game of wealth transfer

Within markets, there is often a game that investors from institutions such as banks and hedge funds play with amateur (retail) investors. The aim is to transfer retail investors’ wealth to these institutions.

This is particularly easy in an unregulated market like bitcoin, because it is easier for institutions to manipulate prices. They can also talk up (or talk down) prices to stir up retail investors’ emotions, and get them to buy at the top and sell at the bottom. This “traps” the irrational investors who buy at higher prices, transferring wealth by giving the institutions an opportunity to convert their holdings into cash.

It therefore makes sense to compare how the retail and institutional investors have been behaving lately. The following charts compare those crypto wallet addresses that hold 1 BTC or more (mostly retail investors) with those holding upwards of 1,000 BTC (institutional investors). In all three charts, the black line is the bitcoin price and the orange line is the number of wallets in that category.

Retail investor behaviour

Institutional investor behaviour pt 1

Institutional investor behaviour pt 2

This shows that since the FTX scandal back in November, which led to the world’s second-largest crypto exchange collapse, retail investors have been buying bitcoin aggressively, resulting in the highest number of addresses holding at least one BTC ever. On the other hand, the biggest institutional investors have been offloading. This suggests that the institutional investors agree with our analysis.

Where we’re heading

There are those who argue that bitcoin is a bubble and that ultimately cryptocurrencies are worthless. That’s a separate debate for another day. If we assume there is a future for blockchains, which are the online ledgers that enable cryptocurrencies, the key question is when bitcoin will reach the accumulation phase that typically ends a bear phase in any market.

Known as Wyckoff accumulation, this is where the price of the asset repeatedly tests two areas: the upper bound where traders previously sold heavily enough for the price to stop rising (known as resistance), and the lower bound where traders bought heavily enough that the price stopped going down (known as support).

At the point where institutional investors decide the lower bound has proved to be sufficiently resilient – in other words, they think the price is cheap at that level – they will start buying the asset again. That moment is only likely to come after there has been a capitulation.

Of course, history does not repeat itself exactly. It may be this is the first time that retail investors have outsmarted the large institutions, and that the only way is now up.

More likely, however, there is more pain on the way. With a recession on the cards, unprecedented job layoffs and weak retail data coming out of the US, it doesn’t point to the kind of optimism that tends to move markets higher. It would therefore make sense to brace yourself for another plunge in the price of bitcoin and the rest of the crypto market.

James Kinsella, PhD Researcher in Finance, University of Bath and Richard Fairchild, Senior Lecturer in Corporate Finance, University of Bath

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Financial contagions can be triggered easily, if conditions are right. First one financial institution falls and then others follow, like a chain of falling dominoes.

The cinder that sparked the global financial crisis in 2007 is considered by many to have been a March 14 briefing by executives of the Lehman Brothers’ investment bank.

Under intense questioning from financial analysts, the executives admitted the bank had overstated the value of billions of dollars in subprime mortgages.

This news saw Lehman Brothers’ stock price crash, and led to investors losing faith in the entire edifice of complex financial deals that had been so profitable for banks and brokers.

As share prices fell, more investors scrambled to sell their stock, driving prices even lower. The contagion spread through global share, property and derivative markets.

Of course, it was a crisis waiting to happen. It took years to create the rickety system that collapsed under pressure. It was going to happen sooner or later. But it still needed a trigger.

We’re at a similar point in cryptocurrency markets.

2022’s major collapses

Last year has seen several major crypto-related collapses.

In May the Terra/Luna cryptocurrency, considered a reputable stablecoin with a total market cap of US$31 billion in April, was wiped out.

In July the US-based crytocurrency lender Celsius, with assets valued at US$12 billion in May, went bankrupt.

Then in November, FTX – one of the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, valued at $US32 billion at the beginning of 2022 – collapsed, taking with it the assets of 1.2 million customers.

Binance fears

Crypto owners are spooked, waiting for the next exchange to drop.

Last week it looked as if that might be the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, after customers withdrew US$1.9 billion of assets in 24 hours.

To put that in perspective, that’s just 3.5% of the US$55 billion in assets Binance reported it was holding on December 18. Binance says withdrawals have settled down.

But the panic was real enough – apparently triggered by some large depositors interpreting a trading halt for one of Binance’s listed coins as signifying something more serious.

Centralised exchanges are a risk

In any market crisis there’s always an underlying problem that provides the fuel for a cinder to spark.

In this case the problem is that Binance and other other centralised crypto exchanges (known as CEX) are riskier than other ways to store crypto assets.

There are good reasons for any crypto owner, after seeing what happened with FTX, another centralised exchange, to withdraw their assets.

The lesson from FTX is that if you don’t have self-custody of your crypto assets, you have no real control.

Centralised cryptocurrency exchanges are more like banks than exchanges. They act as custodians, holding customers’ crypto or fiat currency, similar to holding money in a bank account.

But banks are regulated – in part to minimise the disastrous “bank runs” that occurred regularly in the past.

This includes a global regulatory framework known as the Basel prudential guidelines, introduced in 1988 to ensure every bank holds enough capital and sufficient liquidity to meet withdrawals. It also requires banks to report financial information on a regular basis.

We take all this for granted. But it didn’t happen magically. It’s a function of careful planning based on strict minimum liquidity and capital requirements imposed by banking regulators.

Containing the next crisis

Banks are closely supervised because they hold most of the money in the economy. For the economy to function it is vital that people can store money safely and securely, and accessed when required.

We need the same oversight of cryptocurrency.

Every centralised crypto exchange is in danger if customers’ withdrawals exceed its liquid assets. If it can’t cover withdrawals, it must freeze customers’ accounts. At that point the end is nigh. This is what happened with FTX – albeit the person making the most problematic withdrawals was founder Sam Bankman-Fried.

The next big crypto collapse is not a question of “if” but “when” – and whether governments can work quickly enough to build the regulatory buffers to stop collapse leading to contagion.

It may not be possible to avert a crisis, but it can be contained.

Paul Mazzola, University of Wollongong

Paul Mazzola, Lecturer Banking and Finance, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Wollongong

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.